Well intentioned but doomed.

Bermuda’s Affordable Housing Strategy 2025-2035 aims to deliver 1,350 new units over the next decade. However, it will fail because it:

• Focuses on symptoms rather than the root causes of the housing shortage.
• Is mathematically impossible to achieve.

To actually close the housing gap, policy must address three primary barriers:

1. Red tape: Conflicting mandates stall progress. When the Bermuda Housing Corporation faces constant delays from the Development Applications Board and simple approvals take months, private developers don’t have a hope. Without streamlined approvals, and a single supply targets are unreachable.
2. Inappropriate planning policy: The Bermuda Plan 2018 actively restricts affordable development. Strict low-density rules, large minimum lot sizes, and aesthetic mandates enforcing the "Bermuda Image" block the high-density and modular construction methods necessary to lower housing costs. We need new high density towns, these are illegal. There are also two sets of rules 1. The actual rules as written 2. Whatever nonsense people can get approved by ministerial override. There should be one set of rules for everyone, change the rules to make them work.
3. Low wages: The gap between local pay and real estate prices is a major driver of the crisis. Increasing supply alone cannot help workers who cannot afford to participate in the market.

Housing strategy should be made through the lens of land and wage economics. This means major changes to zoning restrictions, construction economics, tenancy reforms, and property taxation.

1. A Strategy Doomed to Failure: The Mathematical and Spatial Impossibilities of Pillar 1

The Strategy is fundamentally flawed. Pillar 1 relies on the state building up to 1,350 units, but this faces two massive barriers: there’s nowhere to build and no money to build with. If the Government can’t redevelop Leopard’s Club then it’s doomed. In the past when the government has compromised on build quality the future residents have paid the price with massive future remediation costs like the plywood roof structures on some 1980s government condos.

The Spatial Reality: Nowhere to Build

There is simply nowhere to put 950 to 1,350 extra units in the next nine years unless the government is planning to build on Ocean View Golf Course and Government House lands. This constitutes a massive failure baked directly into the plan. While theoretical capacity audits by the Department of Planning might point to scattered vacant Residential 1, Residential 2, and Rural lots, the government does not own the vast majority of this land. Furthermore, these private parcels are highly fragmented. Assembling contiguous, state-owned land capable of supporting high-density, multi-unit developments at the scale required to hit 1,350 units is physically and legally impossible without either eradicating Bermuda's protected conservation zones and agricultural reserves, or enacting aggressive compulsory purchases which are legally fraught and politically toxic. The government is attempting to mandate massive supply targets on an island with negligible macro-level land availability.

The Financial Reality: The Numbers Do Not Add Up

Even if space existed, the costs are unrealistic. Building costs range from $700 to $1,000 per square foot. Even with cheaper modular tech, 1,350 units would cost between $500 million and $900 million.

With national debt over $3.1 billion, the government cannot afford this. Pretending the state can fund a billion-dollar program without a debt crisis is political fiction.

Even if the numbers did add up, spending $14,500 per person in Bermuda to build 5% more housing is a bad deal when the private sector could do with proper reforms and subsidies to the truly financially struggling.

2. Demographic Restructuring and the Illusion of Population-Driven Demand

Housing demand is driven by household formation and income, not just population size. While the Strategy recognizes that demographic shifts cause pressure, its solutions may actually worsen the problem.

The Paradox of a Shrinking Population and a Growing Housing Deficit

Bermuda’s total population peaked around 2010 at approximately 64,237 and has since entered a phase of stabilization and gradual decline, with projections indicating a contraction toward 61,800 by 2035. This decline is driven by a negative natural increase—where mortality rates exceed birth rates—and the outward migration of working-age cohorts. Despite this overall population contraction, homelessness is on the rise. According to the HOME Annual Report 2025, the number of individuals homeless or facing imminent homelessness in Bermuda more than doubled in four years, rising from 555 in 2021 to 1,331 by December 2025.

This deficit is caused by shrinking household sizes. The average fell from 2.61 people in 1991 to 2.26 in 2016, and is projected to hit 2.01 by 2035. A shrinking population still needs more units if people live in smaller groups. The policies we enact today will only come into effect in 2035 to hopefully have relief as the trend continues to 2045 and 2055.

Bermuda is also aging rapidly. By 2035, one in three Bermudians will be over 65. This requires smaller, accessible units. Meanwhile, a smaller youth cohort faces intense pressure in the rental market while trying to live independently.

Demographic Indicator

1991 (Census)

2016 (Census)

2035 (Projected)

Economic Implication for Housing

Total Population

58,460

63,917

61,800

Absolute supply needs driven by fragmentation, not growth.

Average Household Size

2.61

2.26

2.01

Requires more dwelling units per capita; increases demand for micro-units.

Senior Cohort (65+)

11.2%

16.9%

27.3%

Escalating need for accessible, single-level, or supported-living infrastructure.

Youth Cohort (15-34)

30.2%

22.4%

17.5%

Diminished first-time buyer base; high demand for affordable workforce rentals.

The Spatial Mismatch, Bequest Culture, and the Failure of Filtering

The Affordable Housing Strategy responds to these demographic realities by mandating that 50 percent of all newly delivered affordable units be studio or one-bedroom configurations, with an additional 30 percent allocated as two-bedroom units. While this allocation is logically aligned with the statistical trend of single-person household formation, this approach treats new construction as the sole remedy to demographic shifts, thereby ignoring the vital macroeconomic concept of housing "filtering."

Filtering is the process by which older housing stock naturally becomes available to lower-income or younger households as higher-income or older households move into newly constructed or more age-appropriate accommodations. In Bermuda, this filtering process has largely broken down. The island's aging population is frequently "overhoused," with single seniors or elderly couples residing in large, three-to-four-bedroom houses that are no longer suited to their physical mobility or financial maintenance capacities.

This breakdown in filtering is severely compounded by a deeply ingrained cultural expectation in Bermuda: the passing down of the family homestead to the next generation to build generational wealth. Real estate ownership has historically been the primary vehicle for wealth transfer among Bermudian families. The "primary family homestead" tax concession further incentivizes this behavior by exempting a Bermudian's designated primary home from death taxes when transferred to heirs. Consequently, many seniors view their homes not as liquid assets to be sold to fund their retirement or downsize, but as ancestral heritage that must be preserved for their children.

Because of the exorbitant local cost of living, many of these elderly homeowners become "land-rich and cash-poor". Despite sitting on highly valuable assets, they frequently struggle to afford the escalating costs of property maintenance, insurance, and healthcare. Yet, they remain locked in place—partly out of the cultural imperative to bequeath the home, and partly due to a severe lack of refined, single-level downsizing options in the current market.

Without reducing the severe friction costs associated with moving—such as high conveyancing legal fees, property transfer stamp duties, and a chronic lack of desirable, accessible middle-market downsizing options in preferred parishes—older residents will logically choose to age in place in oversized homes. This immobility effectively locks up the existing family-sized housing stock, removing it from the open market and exacerbating the supply shortage for growing, middle-income families. A holistic housing philosophy must balance the construction of micro-units with changing financial incentives like making the primary homestead tax exemption a fixed dollar amount detached from any physical property.

3. The Bermuda Plan 2018: Zoning as an Economic Bottleneck

A major policy conflict exists between the Strategy’s supply targets and the restrictive rules of the Bermuda Plan 2018. While the Ministry wants rapid, high-density development, Planning focuses on low-density conservation and the traditional "Bermuda Image."

Density Limits and the Illusion of Capacity in Residential Zones

Planning claims there is room for 1,764 more units on vacant lots. However, density rules make affordable housing economically impossible on the open market. For this

The Bermuda Plan 2018 does offer a discretionary "Residential bonus" (Policy RSD.6) which permits a maximum density of 30 dwelling units per acre in Residential 1 zones, provided the units are managed as affordable housing. However, from a land economics perspective, a cap of 30 units per acre is still too low for a jurisdiction with Bermuda's astronomical land values and construction costs. By comparison, financially viable affordable housing developments in constrained geographic markets often require densities exceeding 60 to 80 units per acre to offset fixed land and infrastructure costs. The Strategy’s reliance on these modest discretionary bonuses will be insufficient to attract private capital to affordable housing partnerships. Also, the bonuses are entirely discretionary which means any development involving them is inherently very risky. Risk = cost. Better to create explicitly high density zones and new urban villages in places like the Hamilton outskirts, Warwick, and Smiths. Even high density zones like Hamilton are subject to arbitrary and discretionary height limits and expensive requirements for parking and outdoor space. New Urban villages (and Hamilton) paired with excellent public transport and deregulated ridesharing mean that parking mandates are obsolete.

Spatial Minimums and the Floor of Affordability

Compounding the density limits are the strict spatial minimums mandated by the Bermuda Plan 2018. Policy DSN.15 dictates that all new dwelling units must comply with absolute minimum gross floor areas: 275 square feet for a studio, 425 square feet for a one-bedroom, 600 square feet for a two-bedroom, and 800 square feet for a three-bedroom unit. Additionally, Policies DSN.16 and DSN.17 require mandatory private outdoor living space for every unit—ranging from 150 square feet at grade for a studio to 600 square feet for a four-bedroom home.

High standards ensure quality but also set a high price floor. With construction at $850 per square foot, mandatory minimum sizes for apartments guarantee they will be unaffordable without huge subsidies. The government should relax these rules to allow for efficient micro-units, especially in the New Urban towns and Hamilton.

The "Bermuda Image" as an Exclusionary Zoning Tool

Perhaps the most formidable regulatory barrier to the Affordable Housing Strategy is Policy DSN.4 of the Bermuda Plan 2018, which requires that the massing, scale, and design of all new developments be sensitive to and compatible with the "Bermuda Image". The "Bermuda Image" enforces a prescriptive architectural vernacular characterized by stepped white pitched roofs, traditional proportions, specific window-to-wall ratios, and historical massing aesthetics.

The "Bermuda Image" mandate acts as a tool to block affordable housing. Forcing traditional aesthetics onto modular units destroys the savings of prefabrication. The government must create zones where these aesthetic rules are waived to make housing viable.

The State Monopoly on Upzoning: Loughlands and Harmony Club

Developments like Loughlands “succeeded” only because the government bypassed its own rules and rezoned the land. Private developers could do the same if granted the same flexibility, potentially recycling old sites without public money.

Originally, both the Loughlands and Harmony Club properties were strictly zoned for Tourism. For a private developer, converting a defunct hotel property zoned for tourism into high-density residential housing is an almost impossible regulatory hurdle under standard planning procedures. The restrictive policies governing Tourism zones, such as Policy TOU.6 in the Bermuda Plan 2018, prohibit outright residential development unless granted exceptional discretionary approval, often requiring the residential component to be subservient to a functional tourist accommodation.

In the case of Loughlands, the private developer was financially saddled with a hotel component mandated by the zoning that was likely doomed to failure on the open market. The project only became economically viable because the Government intervened as a partner and utilized its executive power to issue a Special Development Order (SDO). The Loughlands Residential Development (Paget Parish) Special Development Order 2006 effectively bypassed the regular Development Applications Board (DAB) planning process, neutralizing zoning density limits and shielding the project from standard public objection periods. This allowed the rapid construction of 96 high-density residential units on land that a purely private actor would have been legally barred from developing in such a manner.

Similarly, the Harmony Club in Paget was a former hotel property that the state acquired and repurposed into affordable and emergency residential housing, only later formalizing the sweeping zoning change from Tourism to Residential in the Bermuda Plan 2018 to reflect its new use.

The fundamental economic lesson from these developments is that rigid zoning, not the underlying economics of redevelopment, is the primary limiter of housing supply in Bermuda. If private developers were granted the same flexible upzoning and exemptions from the Bermuda Plan that the Government routinely grants itself through SDOs, the private sector could organically recycle defunct commercial and tourism sites into residential supply without requiring tens of millions of dollars in public capital.

4. Construction Economics: The Modular Imperative

Traditional masonry costs up to $1,000 per square foot. A 600-square-foot apartment costs $600,000 just to build. This price exceeds what the average household can afford. To solve this, the Strategy suggests modular and steel construction.

To circumvent this mathematical impossibility, the Affordable Housing Strategy proposes the widespread adoption of modular, pre-cast, and panelized steel construction methodologies.

Construction Methodology

Estimated Cost (per sq. ft.)

Build Speed Acceleration

Economic & Regulatory Constraints

Traditional Masonry

$800 - $1,000

Baseline (12-24 months)

Highly labor-dependent; prohibitive for affordable mandates.

Panelized Steel

$650 - $800

30% - 40% faster

Requires advanced corrosion protection in Bermuda.

Stack Modular (Volumetric)

$500 - $700

40% - 60% faster

Requires specialized port logistics and heavy crane capacity.

Capsule/Container Units

~$130 - $250

Immediate (Weeks)

Severe aesthetic clashes; low community acceptance; shorter lifespan.

Modular building saves time. Building indoors eliminates weather delays and allows site prep to happen simultaneously. Faster builds mean lower interest costs on loans, making projects more viable.

The Corrosion Trap: Short-Run Savings vs. Long-Run Maintenance Nightmares

Steel construction saves money upfront but fails in Bermuda’s salt-heavy, humid environment. Salt aggressively attacks metal cladding and structural steel.

Historically, the real-world experience of utilizing steel-framed or container-based prefabrication in Bermuda has been plagued by extreme corrosion issues and drastically shortened lifespans compared to traditional masonry. Bermuda's early settlers quickly abandoned timber frames because they could not withstand the local climate, turning to the heavy limestone and masonry construction that defines the island today because of its inherent durability.

Chasing lower initial costs with steel risks a long-term maintenance disaster. Without expensive marine-grade coatings, these units could rust within a decade. Limestone and masonry are traditional for a reason: they last.

Lifecycle costs are what matter. Saving money today is irrational if the asset must be replaced much sooner than a traditional home. There are no shortcuts.

This is doubly important for “low cost” housing where future owners may not be able to afford the huge capital cost of rehabilitation works and lead to permanently uninhabitable abandoned dwellings decades from now stuck in endless legal limbo of the Condominium Act.

The Boaz Island Pilot: A Case Study in Institutional Friction

The tension between construction economics and regulatory planning was starkly exposed during the proposed Boaz Island Emergency Modular Housing pilot in early 2026. Recognizing the immediate need to shelter individuals facing homelessness, the Bermuda Housing Corporation (BHC) proposed installing nine prefabricated modular "capsule" units on government-owned land at Boaz Island in Sandys.

The short-term economic rationale for the pilot was solid. BHC documents revealed that the cost of each fully equipped, prefabricated capsule unit imported from China was approximately $55,000, exclusive of shipping. By contrast, a traditional masonry build of the exact same square footage would cost the public purse an estimated $287,200 per unit. BHC management rightly argued that this magnitude of savings was "transformative" and represented the only fiscally responsible path to advancing housing delivery in a constrained economic environment.

However, the Development Applications Board (DAB) rightly rejected the proposal because it was plainly illegal in several different ways. The rejection cited direct conflicts with the Bermuda Plan 2018, specifically noting that the capsule units violated the "Bermuda Image," lacked adequate communal space for garbage, and failed to provide the mandated private outdoor living areas.

This case shows a government-induced failure: one government arm tries to provide housing while another blocks it using subjective aesthetic standards. To use modular housing effectively, the government must streamline approvals for viable projects by creating a set of rules that works.

5. Execution Risk and the History of Government Failures: Grand Atlantic and Leopards Club

Historical state-led projects show a pattern of waste and poor forecasting. Relying on government to deliver 1,350 units ignores the government’s poor track record with central development.

The Grand Atlantic / Bermudiana Beach Resort Fiasco

The most glaring precedent is the Grand Atlantic development, which recently morphed into the Bermudiana Beach Resort. Conceived originally in 2007 as an affordable housing project, the BHC was advised in 2009 against pursuing the 78-unit Warwick development due to a lack of genuine market demand. The government proceeded regardless. By 2012, despite 100 percent financing offers being made available to prospective buyers, only a single unit had been sold.

Instead of selling, the government spent $23 million more to try making it a hotel. By 2024, it reverted to rentals. This saga cost taxpayers over $100 million—about $1.28 million per unit. It proves the state is an inefficient developer.

The Leopards Club Redevelopment

Similarly, the Leopards Club has sat derelict for 17 years and counting. In a functioning private market with highest value taxation, this centrally located asset would have been sold and rebuilt in months. With much fanfare the government announced a redevelopment that was lambasted at the time and immediately failed. The state’s inability to act quickly causes neglect.

Implications for the Strategy's Target

Tasking the state with 1,350 units is an existential risk to public finances. The government should stop acting as a developer and instead use funds to subsidize tenants and create a single set of rules de-risk private projects.

6. The Building Code Conundrum:

Beyond zoning regulations, the physical execution of modular housing in Bermuda faces a severe, structural impediment encoded within the Bermuda Residential Building Code 2014.

To ensure water security, the Bermuda Residential Building Code 2014 mandates that all buildings must have at least 80 percent of their roof area sufficiently guttered to catch rainwater. Furthermore, Section 602.3.2 of the Code dictates that the minimum capacity of the required subterranean water storage tank shall be eight times the plan roof area in Imperial Gallons.

Traditional water rules are vital but create hurdles for modular housing. Flat roofs on containers cannot catch water efficiently. Excavating for tanks also negates the speed and cost benefits of modular units.

Although the Code notes that a "tank volume reduction waiver may be granted based on calculated water usage... in cases where a potable public supply is available," relying on ad-hoc waivers introduces unacceptable regulatory risk for large-scale modular developers. To implement the Strategy's modular initiatives effectively, the legislature must formally amend the Building Code to accommodate high-density modular estates and invest in water infrastructure to service them.

7. Tenancy Reform: The Hazards of Rent Control in Supply-Constrained Markets

Pillar 3 of the Strategy aims to unlock 250 to 300 idle, habitable units and return them to the long-term rental market by incentivizing private landlords and reforming the tenancy framework. Concurrently, the Ministry of Home Affairs introduced the Landlord and Tenant Act 2025 Draft Bill to consolidate the outdated Landlord and Tenant Act 1974 and the Rent Increases (Domestic Premises) Control Act 1978 into a single modern framework. I detailed the issues with the proposed legislation at the time via this forum. The tl;dr is that both the existing and proposed rules are punitive to landlords and make the landlords social workers rather than giving social financial support to struggling tenants.

8. Taxation Strategy: Highest and Best Use Valuations and Rigorous Enforcement

Vacancy taxes are popular but often ineffective and hard to manage.

The "Highest and Best Use" Valuation Model

A far more equitable and economically sound approach to spurring development in Bermuda is to assess and tax property based on its "highest and best use." Rather than implementing a pure LVT that disregards all improvements, or relying on easily manipulated vacancy taxes, the government should evaluate and tax derelict properties or vacant, developable land based on its maximum potential market capacity.

Owners of abandoned properties or strategic vacant lots should be taxed based on their maximum potential capacity. This makes hoarding expensive without dismantling the tax code or punishing low-income residents in occupied homes.

There’s also a social justice aspect where the old landed families would be taxed fairly on their land holdings.

The Imperative of Foreclosure Enforcement

Done wrong, aggressive enforcement would cause large suffering but done right it will force people to sell underutilised or derelict property and force people out of homes that they can no longer afford to maintain. Pairing progressive social housing support and policies with foreclosure and sale of tax arrears properties will be a net positive for everyone involved.

Bermuda has struggled with tax collection and is ~$70 million in land tax arrears, with the vast majority being more than 90 days past due. Under the Land Valuation and Tax Act 1967, the Office of the Tax Commissioner has substantial powers to enforce payment, including charging interest on arrears, garnisheeing debts or rental income, and directing bailiffs to seize personal property however none of this is presently enforced. The Tax Commissioer should be adequate resourced and given a streamlined legal mechanism to seize and sell delinquent properties. These mechanisms should provide a compassionate but effective policy to bypass probate deadlocks, family squabbles, and owner neglect to transfer physically deteriorating, tax-delinquent properties directly into the housing supply.

9. Constitutional Friction: Compulsory Rehabilitation vs. Receivership

Pillar 2 of the Strategy aims to restore between 150 and 200 derelict units. While the provision of grants and low-interest loans through the BHC's Private Sector Refurbishment Programme is a positive incentive, it’s just the same “push a string” policies that have failed in the past. More effective are the proposed "new statutory powers, through amendments to the Acquisition of Land Act 1970 and related laws, to allow the compulsory acquisition or rehabilitation of derelict dwellings where ownership is unclaimed or neglect is prolonged". This would be largely redundant to tax foreclosure suggested earlier.

10.The Residual Income Paradigm

A glaring analytical weakness in the Affordable Housing Strategy is its reliance on the archaic "30 percent rule" to define and measure housing affordability. The document states: "Globally, housing is considered affordable when it costs no more than 30 percent of a household’s gross income... Applied to Bermuda, this means households earning under BMD 72,000 should be able to access housing at or below BMD 1,800 per month, and those earning between BMD 72,000 and 120,000 should find options between BMD 1,800 and 3,000".

The 30 percent metric is an arbitrary benchmark derived from mid-20th-century United States public housing legislation. It is a blunt, regressive instrument that assumes all households, regardless of their absolute income level or family size, require the exact same percentage of their income to cover all other non-housing necessities. In reality non-housing necessities are mostly fixed in cost. Insurance, food, and basic transport is virtually the same cost for a low-income family as a high-income family in Bermuda.

Consider the divergence: A single professional earning $120,000 who spends 30 percent on housing ($3,000) has $7,000 a month remaining in residual cash to cover food, transport, and utilities—a highly comfortable margin. However, a family of four earning $60,000 who spends 30 percent on housing ($1,500) has only $3,500 remaining to cover the exorbitant costs of feeding, clothing, and insuring four people in Bermuda. They are deeply impoverished and struggling to survive, despite technically meeting the government's definition of possessing "affordable" housing.

The Superiority of the Residual Income Approach

Modern land economists and housing policy experts increasingly advocate discarding the 30 percent rule in favor of the Residual Income Approach to measure true affordability. This approach abandons the focus on the ratio of rent to income. Instead, it asks a fundamental question: After paying for housing costs, does the household have sufficient absolute dollars remaining (residual income) to purchase a basic, localized basket of necessary goods and services without falling into deprivation?.

Affordability Metric

Methodology

Flaws in High-Cost Island Economies

Economic Validity

30% Rule

Rent / Gross Income

Ignores the absolute localized cost of food, energy, and healthcare. Overstates affordability for large/poor families and understates it for wealthy/small households.

Low. Fails to account for household size variations and localized inflation.

Residual Income Approach

Gross Income - Housing Costs = Residual Funds Basic Needs Basket

Requires robust, localized demographic data on the cost of a "basic needs basket" categorized by household size.

High. Accurately measures true poverty, financial stress, and material deprivation.

By pivoting its analytical framework to the Residual Income Approach, the Bermuda Government would realize that merely building $1,800/month apartments for families earning $60,000 does not solve their economic precarity. Because base construction costs in Bermuda are structurally high, the state cannot force the private market to deliver units at $1,500 a month without catastrophic quality degradation or massive public subsidies.

This realization forces a paradigm shift in policy: rather than exclusively subsidizing expensive brick-and-mortar construction to hit an artificial rent target, the government must explore direct demand-side interventions. Implementing robust, portable housing vouchers (cash transfers) for low-income residents, or enacting aggressive macroeconomic measures to lower non-housing costs (e.g., energy grid reform, import tariff reductions on staple goods), does far more to ensure households maintain a survivable residual income than attempting to fix the price of rent.

11. The Case for New Urbanism: Strategic Upzoning and "New Towns"

By amending the Bermuda Plan to allow for the creation of specific "Village Zones," we can increase our housing supply, lower rents through basic land economics, and—crucially—improve the environmental beauty of our island. The rideshare legislation proposed is deeply flawed and anit-consumer but it’s a step in the right direction. With rideshare and good public transport the need for cars goes down and people should be able to choose a car-free lifestyle, especially when this brings a huge drop in their housing expenses.

The Principles of New Urbanism New Urbanism isn't about building skyscrapers; it’s about returning to the human-scale wisdom of historic St. George’s. It prioritizes:

1. Walkability: Designing streets for people, not just cars.
2. Mixed-Use: allowing corner stores and cafés to exist beneath apartments.
3. Gentle Density: Using 3-to-4 story buildings to create vibrant communities rather than isolated subdivisions.

Density Allows for "Micro-Forests" The biggest fear regarding development is the loss of the "Bermuda Image"—our lush, green character. However, low-density sprawl is actually what kills nature, as it carpets the island in asphalt driveways and manicured lawns. Look at Loughlands, it’s compliant with the letter of the law but it’s just a car-first concrete and grass where residents look out into the back of their shutters rather than into natural beauty.

True Village Zoning concentrates development, which opens up opportunities for native micro-forests. When we build denser village cores, we can mandate that the perimeter and the spaces between buildings are planted with dense, buffers of Bermuda Cedar, Palmetto, and Olivewood. These "green screens" provide superior privacy compared to a standard fence, cool the air, and create corridors for birdlife. We can have higher density and a greener, more private aesthetic simultaneously.

Three Sites for a "Garden Village" Pilot

1. The "PHC Village" (Warwick) The area surrounding the PHC Stadium is ideal for a "Village Green" model. By rezoning the area between Khyber Pass and PriceRite for mixed-use high density 70 residents per acre residential, we create a community anchored by recreation. The density would be focused on the field, while the outer edges could be wrapped in a thick, native forest buffer to ensure total privacy for existing neighbors. It becomes a self-contained, walkable ecosystem near the Railway Trail, on a major bus route, and within easy walking distance of a pharmacy, supermarket, bowling alley, and other businesses.

2. Collector’s Hill (Smith’s) Currently, this is a traffic pinch-point dominated by asphalt parking. A "Village Overlay" could transform it into a true town center. The town is already there, we just need to rezone the area for high density. This opportunity is disappearing right now as the large lots on the South side are being redeveloped into large luxury housing.

3. North Shore Government House Lands. The vast, empty acreage of the Government House waterfront is a missed opportunity. This site could host a master-planned, mixed-income village. It would be a model of "hidden density"—housing hundreds of families in high-quality, traditional Bermudian architecture that is virtually invisible from the road due to aggressive reforestation and landscaping, all within easy walk of C-Mart and the ocean and a quick bicycle, bus, or e-bike into Hamilton.

The Economic Reality Urban land economics teaches us that all new housing lowers prices. Supply is the only thing that tames rent. By preventing the development of new, efficient villages, we are inadvertently driving up the price of every aging cottage on the island, pricing out the next generation.

New Urbanism focuses on creating human-scaled, mixed-use neighborhoods where residents can live, work, and shop without relying on a private vehicle. Bermuda is uniquely positioned to capitalize on this philosophy by transforming existing large, underutilized commercial properties (often characterized by single-story retail surrounded by sprawling surface parking lots) into high-density residential hubs.

12. A Superior Philosophy: The "Enabling Markets" Approach

The Bermuda Affordable Housing Strategy 2025-2035 currently operates on an outdated, mid-20th-century philosophical paradigm: the belief that the state can build its way out of a housing crisis through direct, centralized construction programs while simultaneously imposing restrictive, punitive regulations on the private market. This approach relies on public capital that the government does not have, attempts to build in a regulatory environment that actively resists density, and seeks to punish the private landlords it relies upon to house the majority of the population.

A superior philosophy, heavily endorsed by modern land economists and international development institutions such as UN-Habitat, is the "Enabling Markets" approach. In this framework, the government fundamentally shifts its role from being the primary developer and landlord of last resort to being the architect of a regulatory and financial ecosystem where the private sector, non-profits, and cooperatives are organically incentivized to oversupply the market.

To achieve a sustainable, affordable housing ecosystem that transcends election cycles, Bermuda must adopt a philosophy built on the following economic pillars:

1. Aggressive Regulatory Alignment and Deregulation: The island cannot demand affordable, high-density, modular housing while strictly enforcing the low-density, pitched-roof aesthetics of the Bermuda Plan 2018. Or half-heartedly enforcing it with a “Two Bermudas” approach where the friends and family operate by one set of rules and another exists for the rest of us. The government must introduce "As-of-Right" zoning for high-density residential development in central corridors, embracing "New Urbanism" by upzoning commercial centres into mixed-use hubs. This requires explicitly exempting affordable housing projects from subjective aesthetic reviews by the DAB and modernizing archaic water-catchment building codes to permit community-scale utility solutions.
2. Highest and Best Use Taxation and Enforcement: Pure Land Value Taxation presents regressive risks, but the state must still penalize speculation and hoarding. The government should assess and tax raw land and derelict properties based on their fully developed, fully occupied potential. This must be paired with ruthless enforcement and foreclosure on delinquent tax accounts to transfer blighted properties to responsible developers.
3. Subsidizing People, Not Just Buildings: The reliance on the arbitrary 30 percent affordability rule must be replaced by the Residual Income Approach. Instead of imposing rent controls (which destroy long-term supply) or pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into direct state construction, the government should redirect capital toward robust, portable housing vouchers. Subsidizing the tenant directly bridges the gap between market rents and their required residual income, allowing the private market to respond to demand without price distortion.
4. Fix the Bureacracy: Private development cannot thrive where planning laws are outdated or arbitrary and where rent controls and tenant laws push landlords into acting as social workers. For any of this to work there needs to be a fast, efficient legal process for every step. Months long Planning applications and years-long probate and legal cases undermine affordable housing.

13. Conclusion

The Strategy is well-intentioned but contradictory. It tries to use 21st-century tech in a mid-20th-century zoning framework. It tries to incentivize landlords while introducing rent controls. It also uses arbitrary metrics for affordability that ignore Bermuda’s extreme cost of living.

To close the housing gap and secure homes across generations, Bermuda must embrace the unyielding economic realities of land, labor, and capital. By taxing properties at their highest and best fully developed use, enforcing delinquent tax foreclosures, modernizing zoning to accept high-density, mixed-use "New Towns" by right, adopting the Residual Income Approach to measure true poverty, and abandoning price ceilings in favor of direct tenant subsidies, Bermuda can dismantle the regulatory frictions that have choked its housing supply. Only by shifting from a paradigm of state control to one of market enablement can the island ensure dignity, stability, and economic opportunity for all its residents.